U.S. Foreign Policy on Haiti, 1991-1994

 

HISTORY OF HAITI

            Haiti is a country located in the Caribbean Sea just south of Cuba and directly left of the Dominican Republic.  Haiti was originally inhabited by the Arawak Indians who named the entire island (including the portion currently known as the Dominican Republic) Haiti.  Christopher Columbus landed in Haiti on December 6, 1492 and renamed the island Hispaniola, or "Little Spain".  He and the other Spanish colonizers perpetrated a mass genocide of the Arawaks.  Bartolomé de las Casas campaigned against Indian slavery, but the Spaniards started bringing Africans to the island in 1501.  Soon afterwards, the Spaniards left for Mexico and Peru.

            The island was divided in 1697 by the Treaty of Ryswick into two parts: what is now the Dominican Republic and St. Domingue, now Haiti.  The former was controlled by the Spanish, the latter by the French.  The capital of St. Domingue was Cap-Français.

            There were several Africans who escaped from slavery and formed communities in remote areas of the island.  They called themselves Marrons, from the Spanish word "cimarron", meaning "untamed". 

            At the coming of the French Revolution, there were three classes in Haiti.  The white planters were on top; in the middle were the mostly mulatto free people of color, or "affranchis"; and at the bottom were the mostly black enslaved Africans.  In theory, the affranchis were entitled to the same rights as the whites.  Many owned slaves and plantations.  But in reality, the affranchis were denied the political rights of the grands blancs, or the rich whites.

            While the whites and affranchis were fighting amongst themselves in the context of the French Revolution of 1789, the slave revolution began on August 15, 1791.  It began with a Vodou ceremony held the day before.  A ceremony at Bois-Caman led by a manbo, a female Vodou priest, whose name has been lost, and a male houngan, Bookman, sparked the Haitian Revolution.  As a result, slavery was abolished on August 29, 1793.  Toussaint Louverture, a black man, helped the French to drive the Spanish and British out of St. Domingue.  War broke out between the former slaves, led by Toussaint, and the former affranchis, led by André Rigaud.  In 1801, Toussaint's army won.  He was elected Governor General and took control of the entire island.  His position was even written into the Constitution.  Then, the French decided to come and "restore order" in St. Domingue.  Napoleon Bonaparte sent his army to Haiti to take control of the island and use it as a base to create a colonial empire in the Americas.  Toussaint and his army resisted, but he was defeated by the French General Leclerc, Napoleon Bonaparte's brother-in law.  Toussaint was arrested on June 7, 1802 and was deported to France, where he died in jail on April 7, 1803.

            Dessalines, much like Toussaint Louverture, was a former slave that became a general.  While the French were preparing to reintroduce slavery, Dessalines then took command of the black army and made one final struggle against the French.  The black army won independence on January 1, 1804, ending a 13-year war against the troops of Napoleon Bonaparte.   The name of St. Domingue was changed to the island's original name of Haiti and it became the world's first modern nation created from a successful slave revolt.  It was the second independent state in the Western Hemisphere after the United States.  The national flag was created by tearing the white strip from the French tricolor.  This was symbolic of the expulsion of whites from the country.  The blue and red where joined to represent the blacks' and the mulattos' fight together for independence.  Dessalines was named Governor General for life.  He crowned himself Emperor in October 1804 and was assassinated on October 17, 1806.

            In the beginning, no European country or the United States had recognized Haiti's independence.  They felt that it was a threat to their own colonial systems.  The French established a system in which Haiti had to pay them for recognition of its independence and security.  Haiti then had to borrow from the United States, Germany, and even France itself.  The "debt" was finally paid in 1922, but this was the beginning of a long cycle of economic despair in Haiti.

            The United States did not recognize Haitian independence until 1862, fifty-eight years after the Haitians had won the war.  Haiti's invitation to attend the Panama Congress was withdrawn under U. S. pressure, even though Haiti had assisted in the independence movements of several Latin American countries. Haiti was also excluded from the Monroe Doctrine, established by the U. S. in 1823.  President Ulysses S. Grant even proposed to the Senate that the U. S. annex Haiti.  His annexation idea was defeated in the same year, but he continued his efforts until 1874.

            Throughout the 19th century, Haiti continued to struggle for survival in the international context, as well as in terms of its internal stability.  The U. S. occupied Haiti from 1915 through 1934.  The occupation ended as a result of the resistance and protestation of the Haitian population.

            In the following years, Dumarsais Estimé, who became president in 1946, encouraged the growth of the black middle class.  He was ousted by a bloodless coup on May 10, 1950, led by Colonel Magloire, who was later elected in Haiti's first direct presidential election.  Friendly relations were established with the United States, who, in turn, improved the positions of the rich through aid and tourism.  Vice President Nixon was a guest of Magloire in Haiti.  Magloire then visited the United States, where he addressed a joint session of Congress.  He even had a parade held in his honor in New York.  Magloire was forced into exile by strikes and demonstrations in opposition to his dissolution of the legislature and his attempt to remain in power beyond the expiration of his term.  After his departure, Haiti's first exercise in universal suffrage (including women) was held in the election of September 22, 1957.

            François Duvalier a middle-class black man pledging to resume Estimé's program, ran on a platform of unity, reconciliation, democratic pluralism, independent press, trade union rights, economic redistribution, and progressive social action in construction and agriculture.  However, just six months after he won the election, he began suppressing the supporters of other candidates and arresting prominent opposition figures.  He also weakened the army to remove the threat of a military coup.  Clément Barbot, a black former school teacher, organized the Tonton Macoutes as a counterweight to an unpredictable and potentially disloyal army.  The Tonton Macoutes, or Duvalier's personal militia, were intended to provide information and detect subversion in the Haitian society. 

            On June 14, 1964, Duvalier was pronounced "President-for-Life" by a referendum vote of 2,800,000 to 3324.  There was no ballot box for non (no), only one for oui (yes).  The constitution had been previously revised, allowing Duvalier to nominate his successor to the presidency when he died.  

            In 1969, the legislative assembly approved the minimum age for a president to be lowered from 40 to 18 so that Jean-Claude, Duvalier's son, could take over when the elder Duvalier died.  This happened on April 21, 1971.  U. S. warships stood by, preventing exiles from creating an uprising during a weak point in the country, the change of power.

            Thirty to sixty thousand people had been killed by state terrorism during François Duvalier's reign.  The country had become the poorest in the western hemisphere.  Apart from an airport, funded by the United States, no infrastructural improvements had been made.  Conditions turned professional Haitians to go to Europe, the U. S., Canada, and Africa.  Eighty percent of the money received from the U. S. had been wasted or stolen.  However, the classe intermédiare, the wealthier land-owning peasants, had profited from "Papa Doc's" regime, and they were the basis of his support.  There had been 9 coups from 1957-1971, and Papa Doc had exploited U. S. fears of communism, out-maneuvered the Vatican, destroyed opposition, sand stifled dissent.  All in all, the dictatorship survived, but the regime had achieved nothing in social reform and progress.

            Under "Baby Doc", the oppression and dictatorship continued.  The Catholic church strongly opposed the new president.  They created a Ti Légliz (Little Church) movement in the 1980s, which tried to provide a framework in which peasants could challenge the system and demand change.  True to style, the government responded with terror, killing three school children in Gonaives.^[1]

            After Duvalier left, a "New Junta" took over Haiti.  This junta consisted of Colonel Régala, General Namphy, and Foreign Minister Jacques François. 

            A new constitution was drafted to prevent Duvalierist absolutism.  On March 29, 1987, the constitution was approved by 99.81% of the votes.  It is to be noted that there are no records of how many people actually voted.

            The 1987 constitution created an independent civilian body, responsible for administering the electoral process.  This body was called the Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP).

            The national elections scheduled for November 29, 1987, ended in a massacre of voters by unidentified gunmen in army uniforms and in civilian clothes, while the army was seen criss-crossing the streets.^[2]  The election could not be completed. 

            On December 11, 1987, the junta announced that elections would be held on January 17, 1988.   The elections did take place, but only about 10% of the electorate voted, and those who did so would vote repeatedly in that election.^[3]   A 5 gourde note was included with the ballot paper at some voting stations.^[4]

            Leslie Manigat was the winner.  He was ousted by Namphy on June 19, 1988, who was himself overthrown on September 17, 1988 and replaced by General Prosper Avril, a millionaire who had backed the Duvalier dictatorship.  Avril ruled until February 1990.

            President Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, a junior member of the Supreme Court of Justice, became the next provisional president from March 1990 to January 1991.  She was the first Haitian woman president.

            Jean-Bertrande Aristide was elected as Haitian president on December 16, 1990 by an estimated 67 percent of the vote.  Colonel Raoul Cédras was the chief of security for the election.  His role that day led Aristide to select him for head of the armed forces.

            On January 7, 1991, there was a coup attempt against interim president Pascal-Trouillot, headed by Roger Lafontant, former head of the Tonton Macoutes.  Lafontant was arrested by the Haitian military, but "dechoukaj", or uprooting, followed for three days and an estimated 125 people were killed.

 

HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HAITI

            Many people who would later be heroes of the Haitian independence war fought as part of the French troops on the side of the Americans during the Revolutionary War.  In 1798, before Haiti's independence, diplomatic accords were established between Toussaint Louverture and the Americans.^[5]   Previously, the U. S. had sold weapons to Toussaint when he was fighting the French.  At the independence of Haiti, the U. S. bought the Louisiana Territory from France.  France had no more use for it in building its empire in the Americas.

            The United States operated under racist ideas towards Haiti.  One reason for this was that they considered Haiti a threat, since a provision in the Haitian Constitution granted freedom and automatic citizenship to any runaway slave setting foot in the new country.^[6]   The U. S. refused to formally acknowledge Haitian independence until the year 1862 under President Abraham Lincoln.  Three years later, American slavery was abolished.  Between 1857 and 1900, the U. S. intervened nineteen times in Haitian affairs.

            Between 1849 and 1915, American warships had been continually present in Haitian waters, claiming to protect the lives and property of U. S. citizens.  The U. S. called disintegration of Haitian politics a security risk.  U. S. economic investment in Haiti in 1915 was $4 million.  To the United States, Haiti was strategically important because they perceived a risk in other European countries taking over the Caribbean.

            The United States and France allied to try to penetrate Haiti economically in the early 1900s.  Haiti was an important location in regards to the Panama Canal.  In 1912, U. S. Secretary of State Knox warned Haitian President Leconte, "we are impressed with the conviction that the fullest success of our work is, to a notable degree, dependent on the peace and stability of our neighbors."  This warning went unheeded. 

            The immediate causes of the occupation were a dispute between the Haitian Banque Nationale and the New York City bank and one between the Haitian government and the U. S. owned Haitian National Railroad.  In the first dispute, the Banque Nationale was partly under United States control and the U. S. created a plan to starve the Haitian government into submission to U. S. demands.  The U. S. sent marines to seize Haiti's gold for "safekeeping" in New York.  As for the National Railroad, in sum, it did some unnecessary work, for which Haiti refused to pay the bill.

            Gillaume Sam took power in Haiti in 1915.  He rounded up and imprisoned over 200 opponents from elite mulatto families in Port-Au-Prince.  The families of these people violently revolted against Sam.  He was wounded, but escaped, and gave the order to kill the prisoners.  Every prisoner was executed.  The next day, eighty men stormed the legislation and assassinated Sam. U. S. Admiral Capertown decided to intervene, even if orders from Washington had not yet arrived.  On July 28, 1915, two companies of Marines and three companies of sailors took control of key positions and buildings in Port-au-Prince.  Surprisingly, they faced little resistance at first.   At gunpoint, U. S. troops held a referendum to legalize the occupation of Haiti.  Only 5% of the eligible population voted.  The results were 98,255 yea, 768 nay, obviously influenced by the U. S. intimidation tactics.  On June 19, 1917, the U. S. dismissed Haiti's legislature, which was unable to reconvene until 1930.

            Sudre Dartiguenave was elected as president on August 12, 1915 to be the mediator between the occupiers and the elite.  On July 12, 1918, he, much like the United States, declared war against Germany and signed the Versailles Treaty as a belligerent power, which made Haiti a founding member of the League of Nations.  He also reconstructed the Haitian constitution, removing all obstacles to foreign ownership of land and property in Haiti, facilitating direct U. S. investment.  This U. S. investment tripled between 1915 and 1930.  Also, on June 19, 1918, a law was enacted that allowed whites to own property in Haiti.  Whites could not own land before in Haiti because Haitians saw it as a threat of recolonization.  In 1922, Dartiguenave was ousted and replaced by Louis Borno. 

            Most Haitians were opposed to the U. S. occupation.  Resistance to the occupation was met with press censorship, repression, torture, "indiscriminate killings, bombings, forced labor, expropriation, burning, and ransacking of entire villages.^[7]   In 1918, the cacos, or the peasant based militia, grouped under Charlemagne Péralte and resisted the U. S. forces.  There were two immediate causes of the resistance:  the reinstatement of an old law that required peasants to provide free labor for road construction, and the establishment of agribusiness enterprises.  The reinstatement of the law led the cacos to believe that the U. S. was reinstating slavery in Haiti.  Of the caco resistance, Péralte wrote: "With cruelty and injustice, the Yankees have for four years cast ruin and destruction on our territory...We are prepared to make any sacrifice to liberate Haitian territory."  In this struggle, over two thousand cacos died; more than one hundred Marines and Gendarmes were killed or wounded.  Péralte was later betrayed and shot dead by U. S. troops.  Benoît Batraville took over control of the cacos and fought until 1920, when he was killed.  The death of Batraville signified the end of the rebellion.

            The United States and Borno established a seven year period of collaboration.  In this period, roads, hospitals, bridges, port facilities, and street lights were built and improved upon; a telephone system was introduced; drinking water was further purified; a program of reforestation was developed; and there were greater opportunities for training and education in Haiti.  However, a strong sense of underlying racism prevailed.  The rural majority was threatened by eviction.  The U. S. tried to suppress Vodou, the religion that the Haitians had brought over from Africa and several continued to practice.  Haitians were excluded from U. S. clubs and associations.  Military personnel were selected from among men from southern states of the U. S., because they were reputedly accustomed to "handling blacks".  Colonel Waller from Virginia once described the elite:  "They are real niggers and no mistake - there are some very fine looking, well educated polished men here, but they are real nigs beneath the surface."^[8]

            People began to protest Borno's government and the U. S. intervention, so more Marines came to suppress the protesters.  On December 6, 1929, 1,500 peasants marched peacefully in protest to les Cayes.  Twelve were shot dead by U. S. Marines and several were wounded.

            Sténio Vincent was elected to the presidency in 1930.  In August, 1933, a treaty was signed between the United States and Haiti to recognize full Haitian independence, but allowing for a "special relationship with the U. S.".  President Vincent visited Washington in 1934 and President Franklin D. Roosevelt followed suit in 1934, being the first U. S. president ever to set foot in Haiti.  On August 15, 1934, all of the U. S. Marines left Haiti. 

            After President Vincent went into exile and retirement, the U. S. favorite to succeed him was Elie Lescot.  In December 1941, Haiti expressed solidarity with the U. S. by declaring war on Japan and the other Axis countries and became a founding member of the United Nations. 

            François Duvalier's became president of Haiti in 1957.  At first, he maintained good relations with the United States by inviting U. S. marine corps to train the reorganized Haitian military.  As a result, Duvalier received direct financial aid and increased loans.  However, he became suspicious of the U. S.  He believed that Washington had supported a previous failed coup, the "deputy sheriffs invasion", in which mulatto officers, U. S. marines, and three deputy sheriffs from Miami and Buffalo invaded the Dessalines barracks.  He also believed that Déjoie, a political rival, was the object of U.S. sympathy. 

            Later, the U. S. administration claimed that they were alarmed by activities of the Tonton Macoutes, the maltreatment of U. S. citizens in Haiti, Duvalier's ambivalence towards communism, and the self-proclaimed Marxists that were present within the Haitian government.  Duvalier used the United States' fear of communism to extort more money by implicitly threatening to switch in that direction.  On June 25, 1960, Duvalier made his famous "Cri de Jacmel" speech in which he said that if the U. S. did not increase aid, Haiti would look elsewhere for help (elsewhere meaning Cuba, meaning communism).  On January 2, 1962, Duvalier delivered a speech which criticized U. S. policy in the Caribbean and which demanded large and unconditional increases in aid.  This led the U. S. to become very wary of Duvalier.

            After Duvalier made himself "President-for-Life" in 1964, tensions surprisingly lessened between the U. S. and Haiti.  U. S. Ambassador Benson E. Timmons III returned to Port-au-Prince to congratulate Duvalier. 

            Jean-Claude Duvalier took power on April 22, 1971, the day after his father's death.  Gaining U. S. support was an immediate priority for him.  He announced that he would fight communism.  This statement was made mainly for the approval of the American government.  Ambassador Knox called for increased aid to Haiti and for extended cooperation between the two countries.  The same year, he was kidnapped by opponents of Duvalier who wanted 12 Haitian political prisoners to be freed.  He was later released.  In July 1972, six high-ranking US officers visited Haiti to advise on the restructuring of armed forces.  This visit marked the end of a ten year mutual animosity where the U. S. withheld military support from Haiti.

            Economic problems and political repression sent many Haitians leaving their country for the U. S., starting in 1972.  The boats that transported these "boat people" highly overcharged them.  The Haitian government cooperated in this scheme because the owners of the boats would often bribe them.  Also, Duvalier thought that if people found work in America, they would send money back to their relatives and increase Haiti's financial option.  U. S. employers also liked the coming of the refugees because the refugees were willing to work at low wages.  However, many Americans viewed the arrival as a strain on housing and social services.

            Jimmy Carter was elected as President of the United States in 1976.  He insisted that respect for human rights was a precondition for U. S. assistance.  So, Haiti had to project an image of liberalization.  On August 15, 1977, Andrew Young, the U. S. representative in the United Nations, came to visit Haiti and warned the government that Haiti had to demonstrate human freedom and development to get U. S. aid.  On September 22, 1977, 104 prisoners were released.  U. S. representatives and foreign journalists were invited to the prison to watch as this occurred.  Duvalier announced that the next decade of Duvalierism would be characterized by a gradual democratization of institutions.  Amnesty International dismissed the Haitian government's claim that there were no political prisoners in the country in 1973.  AI reported no change in 1977 or 1978.  The Organization of American States' mission in 1978 stated that the intention of liberalization was not carried out.  October 1979 marked the beginning of the end of Haitian liberalization.  The press was silenced with legislation that outlawed criticism of the government.  Ronald Reagan was elected U. S. President in 1980. 

            In 1981, the Haitian government was forced to sign an agreement with the U.S. stating that the Americans could prevent the arrival of Haitian immigrants by force.   "Currently, Haiti is the only country with whom the U. S. has a Migrant Interdiction Agreement.  Under this agreement , which was signed on September, 23, 1981, the Coast Guard is authorized to board private Haitian vessels.  The Coast Guard is also authorized to return to Haiti those individuals outside U. S. territorial waters who do not qualify for refugee status and who are determined to be in violation of U. S. immigration or appropriate Haitian Laws," stated Rear Admiral W. Ted Leland of the U. S. Coast Guard in 1989.^[9]

            On December 9, 1985, the U. S. State Department issued a condemnation of Duvalier's closing of Radio Soleil, a radio station which reported that he bribed people to vote in his favor at a referendum. The Reagan administration withheld $26 million of scheduled aid as protest against the government's recent actions to attempt to stifle opposition.  When Duvalier went into exile in February 1986, the Reagan administration refused to accept him in the United States. 

            After Duvalier left, Reagan returned foreign aid to Haiti.  General Henri Namphy, the head of the junta in power, visited the United States and received economic aid and an assurance of U. S. support for the junta. 

            Washington based its foreign policy approach on two assumptions, the first being that the transition from a dictatorship to a constitutional rule could result in a "friendly" civilian administration.  The second one was that the military, as the director of the interim regime would facilitate such an outcome.  All in all, the U. S. wanted the elections to proceed in Haiti. 

            The United States continued its involvement in Haitian affairs throughout the following provisional presidencies.  At the end of May 1990, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot visited Washington to ask for assistance in preparing the elections.            

 

WHEN ARISTIDE WAS OVERTHROWN

           

            Aristide began his presidency on February 7, 1991.  On April 4, he had Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, his predecessor, put under house arrest for alleged diversion of public funds.  She was later released after pressure from the international community.  Meanwhile, Aristide continued to face opposition from various affluent sectors and dissenters among his supporters.

            On August 13, mobs of Aristide supporters disrupted the Haitian parliament when it was considering a vote of no-confidence in Prime Minister René Preval, on a charge of interrogating political prisoners and denying them recourse to legal action.

            September 27, 1991 marked the final week of Aristide's rule before being ousted.  That day, Aristide returned to Haiti from a UN visit and delivered a speech on the national palace steps that hinted at his approval of necklacing.  He told a mass rally that if they should see "a faker who pretends to be one of our supporters...just grab him.  Make sure he gets what he deserves...with the tool you have now in your hands [the burning tire]...You have the right tool in your hands...the right instrument...What a beautiful tool we have.  What a nice instrument.  It is nice, it is chic, it is classy, elegant and snappy.  It smells good and wherever you go, you want to smell it."^[10]

            A day later, on September 28, Sylvio Claude, who had run against Aristide in the presidential campaign, was necklaced by Aristide supporters for speaking against him.  The next day, Roger Lafontant, who had attempted a coup against Ertha Trouillot, was murdered in his jail cell, allegedly on orders from the National Palace.

            Aristide was overthrown seven months into his presidency on September 30, 1991, where he went to Venezuela in exile.  The Haitian military then took control.

            When Aristide was finally overthrown, he persisted in trying to gain back his seat.  In an article published in The New York Times on October 27, 1991, he stated that: "The coup leaders have charged our government with abuses of human rights and suggested that this justifies their violent actions.  But what could be a worse human rights violation than overturning the constitutional democracy that is a guarantor of human rights?"^[11]  Aristide concluded by asking for an embargo and for the Organization of American States to restore him to power. 

            The same week that Aristide's article was printed in The New York Times, Jean-Claude H. Roy, the president of The Union des Constitutionnalistes Haitiens, wrote a letter to the editor of the Observateur stating that several of Aristide's claims were fabrications and that Aristide did, in fact, condone mob violence, since many of his supporters attacked the headquarters of other political organizations, beat up legislators and threatened to necklace them, and threatened to burn down a

 

building if a vote of no confidence was taken against Aristide's prime minister.  René Préval, the Minister of interior and defense, made no move to stop the mob. 

 

U. S. ACTION

            After he was overthrown, at a speech before the OAS on October 2, 1991, Aristide appealed for a delegation to be sent to Port-au-Prince in order to "explain to the criminals who have taken power what economic price they will pay, and what other measures could be taken if they do not step aside."  On October 3, 1991, the Organization of American States adopted a resolution calling on member nations to suspend economic activities with Haiti.  The next day, the U. S. froze the Haitian government's United States bank accounts and banned U. S. firms from making any payments to the regime in Haiti. 

            However, Aristide later had access to these frozen assets, made available to him by the U. S. government.  Aristide, who was still recognized by the U. S. as Haiti's legitimate president, had access to the money through his ambassador, Jean Casimir.  Aristide drew on funds ranging from $500,000 to $1.1 million a month, according to Ira Kurzban, a Miami lawyer who was general counsel to Haiti since before Aristide's overthrow.  An article by Marie-Thérèse Thomas stated that Aristide paid lobbyists to gain influence within the U. S. government from these frozen assets.

            Later that week, on October 8, the OAS adopted a resolution calling on member nations to freeze Haitian government assets and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti.  On October 29, President Bush banned all commercial trade with Haiti to punish the military dictatorship.  A senior Bush foreign policy official stated that the action was meant to remind the militaries of other Caribbean and Latin American countries that "coups don't pay".^[12] 

            On February 23, 1992, the Washington Accord, calling for the naming of a new prime minister was signed.  The Accord acknowledged Aristide as president, but set no date for his return to Haiti.  It stated that the signatory parties recognized the need to "request the OAS and the international community to contribute substantial emergency aid to the national consensus government in order to revitalize the Haitian economy, promote social well-being, ensure the professionalization of the armed forces and the police, and strengthen democratic institutions," as well as the need to "reject and condemn any intervention by foreign armed forces in settling the affairs of Haiti."  This document was signed by Aristide; Dejean Belizaire, the President of the Haitian Senate and of the Parliamentary Negotiating Committee; and Alexandre Medard, President of the Haitian Chamber of Deputies and Vice President of the Parliamentary Negotiating Committee.  By March, however, the Haitian Parliament had failed to approve a new prime minister.  The Washington Accord appeared to be dead.

            In early April, the "new flood" of Haitian refugees began, brought on by the embargo.  The Haitian people were suffering severely in the sanctions.  Malnourished babies crowded the hospitals.  Magid Cobody, director of a hospital in Cite Soleil, Port-au-Prince's biggest slum, said:  "Many parents have no money to feed their children at all, so they leave them here [the pediatric ward of the hospital] even after they are treated.  The embargo has made things dramatically worse.  I would say that 90 percent of the children here are malnourished." 

            The Bush administration converted part of the U. S. base at Guantanamo into a temporary refugee camp, where Haitians were screened.  Initially, 30 percent were allowed to continue into the United States.  But on May 24, Bush announced in Executive Order 12807 that all Haitian refugees picked up at sea would be returned to Haiti.  At that time, Guantanamo closed its doors to refugee processing.

            United States policy toward the Haitian boat people was composed of two separate elements:  the interdiction of Haitian boats by the U. S. Coast Guard to prevent refugees from reaching the United States, and the resettlement of refugees in temporary safe havens outside the United States. 

            On June 9, U. S. presidential candidate Bill Clinton declared the Bush administration's Haitian refugee policy unacceptable.  The major concern about interdiction was that it returned Haitians to danger and possible persecution, without a hearing for their asylum request.  This violated the 1981 agreement between Haiti and the United States, and - in the eyes of many international lawyers - was tantamount to refoulement (forced return).^[13]

            On June 19, Marc Bazin was installed as the de facto prime minister.

            From September 1-4, OAS-sponsored talks took place between the de facto foreign minister François Benoit and Aristide representative Father Adrien.  The de facto government committed to allowing human rights observers into Haiti.

            On September 30, 1992, President George Bush announced to Congress that the embargo was not working:  "The crisis between the United States and Haiti that led to the declaration on October 4, 1991, of a national emergency has not been resolved...The United States remains committed to a multilateral resolution of this crisis through its actions implementing the resolutions of the Organization of American States with respect to Haiti.  For these reasons, I have determined that it is necessary to maintain in force the broad authorities necessary to apply economic pressure to the de facto regime in Haiti."^[14]            

            On January 14, 1993, president-elect Clinton announced that his administration would continue Bush's policy of forcible repatriation.  The U. S. deployed 22 vessels around Haiti to stop the refugees in their tracks.  Refugees from Haiti, Cuba, China, and the Dominican Republic were interdicted in 1993 and 1994, but interdiction was not applied evenhandedly.  Interdicted Haitians were denied asylum, while interdicted Cubans were taken initially to Key West and given automatic parole.^[15]        In March, Laurence Pezzulo was named special adviser on Haiti to the U. S. Secretary of State.  On June 4, the United States imposed new sanctions against Haiti.  Haiti Observateur advocated the abolition of the embargo, while highlighting even more shortcomings in Aristide's logic:  "While deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his followers insist on reinforcing the embargo on an already devastated Haiti, and the Organization of American States equivocates on what to do with the embargo that is literally destroying Haiti, CARE, the U. S. humanitarian agency, sends an S. O. S. to well-to-do individuals in America imploring them to help save the thousands starving in Haiti.  Where is the logic and the humanitarianism in all this?"^[16]

            At a press conference on June 17, Clinton said that the U. S. was pushing for a U. N. resolution to increase sanctions on visas, assets, and oil.  He also said that the United States and Aristide had both rejected a proposal to send a multinational force to Haiti to put Aristide back in power.  "So we decided to go back to the drawing board, look for tougher sanctions," he stated.  He also added that Black Caucus were the "first people that asked me to do it.  And very shortly after the meeting, I agreed to go forward,"^[17] the "it" being the stronger embargo placed on Haiti.

            On June 23, the UN oil embargo and the freeze of Haitian leaders' assets went into effect.   July 3, the Governors Island Agreement was signed by Cédras and Aristide, which called for a new prime minister and government, general amnesty law, resignation of military leaders, a UN-mandated military and police training mission in Haiti, and Aristide's return to Haiti by October 30.  Pezzulo assumed a leading role in this agreement.

            August 27, the Haitian parliament confirmed Robert Malval as Prime Minister and approved a new government.  The international embargo against Haiti was suspended.  But, on October 13, the UN reimposed oil and certain economic sanctions against Haiti.  The United States ordered its navy into Haitian waters to enforce the embargo. 

            October 30, the date for Aristide's return, passed.  On December 1, Prime Minister Malval arrived in Washington for consultations with Aristide.  There, Malval offered a proposal for a diplomatic resolution to the Haiti crisis, seeking to hold a national conference in which all segments of Haitian society would be represented.  The purpose of the national conference would be to form a new government that was more broadly based and that would encourage the military to negotiate a resolution more or less in compliance with the Governors Island Agreement. Five days later, Clinton endorsed Malval's plan at a White House meeting with Aristide and Malval.  Malval met in Paris with representatives of the Four Friends of Haiti, an international group consisting of Canada, France, Venezuela, and the United States, and presented his plan for a national conference.  They approved it, as well as the Pope.  However, on December 15, Aristide rejected Malval's plan.  The State Department, on instructions from the National Security Council, withdrew their support for the plan.  Malval then resigned as Prime Minister.

            On December 21, the Four Friends of Haiti sent a military delegation to Haiti.  Cédras refused to meet with them.  The delegation issued a warning in a news conference from the Port-au-Prince airport that the military leaders of Haiti must step down by January 15 or face tougher sanctions.  By January 15, 1994, the deadline passed without a response from the Haitian military leaders.  France and Canada urged increased sanctions, but the United States held back approval, fearing that increased sanctions would lead to a new refugee crisis.

            February 6, the Haitian parliamentary delegation arrived in Washington to make a final effort at a diplomatic resolution.  At first, Aristide refused to meet with them.  At the meeting, he blasted the group and its plan to name a new prime minister and a new, more broad-based government.  He also said that he had spoken with and gotten Clinton's approval on his own plan.  However, Clinton said that he never spoke with Aristide about another plan.  On March 5, Aristide met with the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and rejected the parliamentarians' plan to resolve the crisis.

            In public statements, Aristide challenged the Clinton administration for what he called its "racist policy".  In a letter dated April 6, 1994, Aristide informed Clinton that he was giving him six months to abrogate the 1981 treaty between Duvalier and the U. S. That treaty gave the U. S. the right to forcibly return Haitian refugees in international waters to Haiti.  Within days of the letter, Americas Watch and the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees criticized the administration's Haiti policy for not fully supporting Aristide and for forcibly repatriating refugees.  They also called on Clinton to replace Pezzulo.  Members of the Black Caucus, including Representatives Maxine Waters, Cynthia McKinney, Charles Rangel, and John Lewis, attacked the administration's attempts to persuade Aristide to make concessions to the Haitian military as a means to ending the diplomatic stalemate.^[18]

            April 12, Randall Robinson, the Executive Director of TransAfrica, began his hunger strike to protest the administration's repatriation policy.  "Sometimes you have to guilt trip people," Gwen McKinney, his and Aristide's PR consultant stated.^[19]   Robinson demanded that the administration impose stronger sanctions on Haiti as well.  "No reasonable person would advocate military action in Haiti as a first choice.  However, in the face of the ongoing brutalization of the Haitian people, Gen. Raoul Cédras and his cohorts are not leaving people of conscience any alternatives.  Economically, politically and socially, the United States simply can no longer afford to appease the Haitian military", he wrote.^[20] He stated that he would continue his strike until the policy ceased and informed the media that his life was in Clinton's hands.

            On April 21, under considerable panic over Robinson's threat, the administration announced that it will press for stronger sanctions against Haiti at the UN, including a complete economic embargo and closure of the Dominican border with Haiti.  The administration also permitted 400 refugees picked up off the coast of Miami to enter into the U. S. as a "humanitarian gesture".

            April 26, Lawrence Pezzullo was forced to resign, as an appeasement to Aristide.  On April 28, the administration announced that, along with tougher sanctions, the U. S. would seek to suspend air traffic to Haiti.  On May 6, the UN announced a complete economic embargo against Haiti, effective May 21, unless the Haitian military leaders stepped down.  The policy assumption was that Haiti's military leaders and their civilian allies would be forced into negotiations by economic strangulation.  These policy considerations were paradoxical, in that:

• 1. Haiti was not perceived by the U. S. government to achieve democratization in the near future.
• 2. U. S. and wider international support was unlikely unless Haiti was able to demonstrate progress toward the "democratizing" objective.
• 3. The reality of years of a dysfunctional Haitian economic environment, compounded by the severity of the UN embargo, weakened Haiti's already poor infrastructure.^[21]

            On May 8, the Clinton administration announced new procedures for handling Haitian refugees and named former Representative William Gray III as special advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on Haiti. Gray's job was to advise on the implementation of the embargo and on a new refugee policy.  Randall Robinson then ended his 27-day hunger strike.  Over the coming weeks, refugees picked up at sea were allowed to make their case for status, were temporarily cared for in safe havens, and could possibly resettle in the United States. 

            At this time, Clinton was looking into military invasion as an option for Haiti.  Many Haitians did not want invasion.  Aristide, however, remained silent on this issue.  "If President Aristide wants to remain loyal to the Constitution of his country, he must without delay state officially and unequivocally that foreign military intervention in Haiti should not be considered as a valid option.  Under the present circumstances, his silence on this issue amounts to approval, which eventually may lead to his impeachment for high treason, if in fact the foreign troops land in the country," stated an article in Haiti-Observateur in New York and Le Nouvelliste in Port-au-Prince by Teddy Thomas and Marie-Thérèse Labossière Thomas printed during the week of May 4 - 11, 1994.

            In a discussion of the Haitian crisis at the OAS on May 11, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Uruguay rejected the use of force under any circumstances.  Aristide himself had stated before that Haitian law barred him from requesting foreign intervention.^[22]  Also, for many Americans, military intervention in Haiti was seen as unfavorable in the wake of such foreign policy dilemmas as Somalia: 

            "I think Somalia is a good analogy," said Mark Lowenthal, a foreign policy expert at the Congressional Research Service, referring to a U. S. attempt at "peace making" that began with a great promise but ended in disaster.  U. S. Marines met little resistance when they stormed the beaches as Mogadishu in 1992 in what the Bush administration predicted would be a quick mercy mission to stop tens of thousands from starving.  But when the humanitarian goal was met it was decided the success would be wasted unless the American-led U. N. force stayed on to rebuild a shattered Somali political system.  But political reconciliation proved too costly; after 18 Army soldiers were killed in Mogadishu on October 3, 1992, Clinton gave up on Somalia and pulled out.  Somalia was then on viewed in Washington as an example of how American military power sometimes is the wrong tool for resolving an essentially political conflict.^[23]

            On May 21, the tougher UN sanctions went into effect.  The United States ordered 650 Marines to Guantanamo in the event that U. S. citizens required evacuation from Haiti.  On June 10, the Clinton administration announced that it would end all air traffic to Haiti, effective June 21, and restricted financial transfers to Haiti from the United States.  June 16, the Clinton administration announced that new procedures for handling Haitian refugees were in place.

            On June 22, the U. S. expanded the freeze on Haitian assets and suspended air traffic to Haiti.  A week later, on June 29, the U. S. revoked all nonimmigrant Haitian visas and reopened Guantanamo to process Haitian refugees.  On July 5, the Clinton administration announced that no Haitian refugees picked up at sea would be permitted to resettle in the U. S.  The flood of refugees abated in a few days.

            July 7, 1994, Panama withdrew an offer to accept up to 10,000 Haitian refugees, although the incoming president indicated that he was willing to accept some refugees for up to six months.  Safe havens able to hold a total of 11,000 refugees were also negotiated with other Caribbean nations, with limited success.^[24] 

            On July 11, the Haitian regime expelled UN/OAS human rights observers.

            One of the thorniest dilemmas of the negotiations for Aristide's return was how to achieve the resignation of most of the army high command without provoking sudden anarchy in the Haitian army and in the society at large.^[25]   At this point, Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for

U. S. Policy states that the United States had four options in dealing with the Haitian crisis:

• 1. It could maintain the long-standing Bush and Clinton policy, combining the embargo and diplomatic efforts. This was the Clinton administration's choice for nearly two years and, in retrospect, probably led to greater misery in the country. This course was followed largely because of domestic political pressures from the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) and its fervent support of President Aristide.
• 2. The effort in Haiti could have been abandoned in much the same way the international community seemed to abandon Somalia. This would have entailed ending the embargo and accepting the status quo in Haiti.
• 3. The United States could have pushed for a negotiated settlement involving President Aristide, the military junta, the political parties, the parliament, the business community, and the middle class. Unlike the prior options, this would have required more U. S. diplomatic engagement, but it was the most likely to meet U. S. policy goals in Haiti. Option three also relied on the assumption that a successful negotiation would not automatically call for President Aristide's return to Haiti, at least not immediately.
• 4. The fourth option was some form of military action. This option would solve the administration's refugee problem by allowing the return of all would-be refugees after "democracy was restored." All along, the difficulty with this option has been that an invasion creates a myriad of other problems; if an invasion force crushes the Haitian army and police, who would replace them? Would this mean they [U. S. troops] would serve as President Aristide's police force? Can Haiti's fundamental social and political problems be solved by a foreign military force? Will U. S. troops intervene to protect one side against another in Haiti's often violent internal struggles?^[26]

            On July 31, the UN approved a resolution authorizing the formulation of a multinational coalition and authorized the use of force to restore democracy in Haiti.  August 19, Clinton approved a timetable for intervention.  A week later, on August 26, Clinton gave formal approval to invasion plans. 

            In an article in Haiti Observateur, Teddy Thomas refuted six reasons given by Clinton as to why the United States wanted to invade Haiti.  Clinton's reasons included the following: Haiti is situated in the back yard of the United States, the Haitian military overturned a democratically elected chief of state, and that there was a continuing possibility that Haitians that were made poor and hopeless would flock to the United States in boats.  In response to the statement that Haiti is in the back yard of the United States, Mr. Thomas said that Hitler used that same pretext when he went to invade his neighboring countries.  The reason of the overturning of a democratically elected chief of state is refuted by saying that there was evidence of fraud in the Dominican Republic elections of 1994, which the United States helped cover up in exchanged for that country's cooperation with the embargo, indicating a double-standard in the thinking of the United States.  In response to the U. S. fear of another wave of "boat people", Mr. Thomas pointed out that engraved on the Statue of Liberty was:  "Give me your tired, your poor...".  After that, six hidden reasons were given as to why the U. S. wanted to invade Haiti, but did not say it, including: the cost of the current policy, the need to calm the Black Caucus, and the desire for a foreign policy victory.^[27]

            On August 30, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott met in Jamaica with four Caribbean leaders regarding their commitments to join the multinational coalition.  On September 15, Clinton addressed the nation to prepare the country for a possible invasion of Haiti.  He said that his administration had exhausted all diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis and that he was prepared to use U. S. forces as part of a multinational coalition of forces to:

• 5. protect U. S. interests.
• 6. secure U. S. borders and preserve stability in the hemisphere.
• 7. promote democracy.
• 8. uphold the reliability of U. S. commitments around the world.

He warned the Haitian military leaders to leave immediately.  "Your time is up," he said.^[28]

            Clinton issued the final orders of Saturday, September 17, for an invasion to begin at 12:01 am, September 19, "H-Hour". 

            "He understood why the military opposed an invasion and knew there would be no public support.  But he hated the appearance of being pushed around by two-bit dictators," said George Stephanopoulos in his book All Too Human: A Political Education.^[29]   He also says that:  "We didn't have the votes, not even close.  Congress wasn't about to give President Clinton political cover for an unpopular invasion, so restoring democracy to Haiti required sacrificing a bit of it here at home...Led by two war heroes, Senators Bob Dole and John McCain, the Republicans pounded Clinton, arguing that...Clinton was ordering the invasion not to protect national security, but to appease a political constituency...Aside from Harry Belafonte and a few members of the Black Caucus, no one was clamoring for an invasion of Haiti.  This was our most unpopular act since gays in the military...Taking a lonely stand on a tough issue like Haiti was the best way for Clinton to demonstrate presidential character." (p. 307-8) 

            However, that day, a delegation of former president Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell arrived in Haiti for a last-minute effort to peacefully resolve the Haitian crisis.  "He had no intention of halting the invasion, Clinton told me.  But we could go with his blessing, provided we stuck to negotiating only how, not if, our troops would go ashore...We sat down at a conference table where Jimmy Carter made clear that the invasion was inevitable.  Our hope, he explained, was to make it happen peacefully rather than bloodily.  Carter started laying out attractive terms to persuade the junta to give up the fight, including amnesty and an offer that Cédras and the others might not be barred from returning to Haiti at some time in the future.  Cédras was offended.  ‘Our constitution does not allow exile,' he said," recounted Colin Powell in his autobiography, My American Journey (p. 598).

            September 18, the Haitian government and the Americans signed the Carter-Jonassaint Agreement.  Jonassaint signed the agreement to avoid bloodshed:  "I am going to sign this agreement.  I will not let my people suffer further tragedy.  I choose peace."^[30] 

            The agreement stated that "certain military officers of the Haitian armed forces are willing to consent to an early and honorable retirement"  by October 15 in exchange for the trade-off that "the economic embargo and the economic sanctions will be lifted without delay".  This agreement was signed six hours before Clinton's forementioned ‘H-Hour', or when he intended to invade Haiti.                        Clinton informed the nation in a televised address that the Carter delegation had successfully negotiated a peaceful resolution to the crisis.  On September 19, U. S. forces peacefully entered Port-Au-Prince.  October 10, Cédras formally submitted his resignation, effective October 12.

            On October 14, 1994, Bill Clinton terminated the "emergency with respect to Haiti" in executive order 12932:  "I, William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, find that the restoration of a democratically elected government in Haiti has ended the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States previously posed by the policies and actions of the de facto regime in Haiti and the need to continue the national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12775 of October 4, 1991, to deal with that threat."^[31]

            The next day, Aristide returned to Haiti to resume power.  Upon his return, he delivered a speech at the presidential palace in the presence of several international government leaders and his supporters.  In this speech, he said, "Walk hand in hand every day with the Haitian military, which wants peace, and the U. S. military and the multinational force, which are here to ensure complete security."^[32]

POST-INTERVENTION

           

            In a 1999 article from the Washington Post, Haiti's post-intervention status was summarized: 

"In 1994, 20,000 American troops landed [in Haiti], promising to restore democracy.  During the ensuing five years, troops remained there at an annual cost of $20 million to American taxpayers, and Haiti became the top Latin American recipient of U. S. development aid.  Yet it now seems that the world's only superpower has had remarkably little impact on this micropower of 7 million people.  With an air of resignation, the administration recently let it be known that the U. S. garrison in Haiti would be closed by the end of the year.

            There is no easy explanation for this debacle.  Critics of the administration's pro-democracy diplomacy sometimes have accused it of focusing too much on elections and not enough on the civic institutions that underpin democracy.  This is not the case in Haiti.  America, along with other foreign donors, has trained a new police force, but vigilantes still reign.  America has trained lawyers and judges, but there are still few fair trials.  America has strained to reduce corruption by reforming the civil service.  But corruption remains fabulous, and much of it is said to be run by the man whom American troops returned to the presidency, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

            America also did try to promote elections, and in 1995 a successor to Mr. Aristide was voted into office, marking Haiti's first democratic transition from one president to the next.  But even in the electoral sphere the record is depressing.  Observers reported that cheating in 1995 was more prevalent than in 1990, before the American invasion.  Turn out was down, and it did not pick up for the 1997 parliamentary vote.  Another parliamentary election, due this November, may not be held.  Formally, power resides with President René Preval, the winner of the 1995 election.  But Mr. Preval is thought to do Mr. Aristide's bidding, and his democratic credentials were undermined when he dissolved parliament in January and started to rule by decree."^[33]

            So Clinton, so to speak, achieved his goal of putting Aristide back in power.  But did he achieve his goal of "restoring democracy"?  Many people say no.  "Political paralysis has made a mockery of what was billed as the restoration of democracy, dramatized by the fact that in a country of eight million people, only nine current officeholders are elected, including President René Preval...  There has been no Parliament for more than 10 months and elections scheduled next spring for a new one are uncertain at best."^[34]

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Abrams, Elliott.  "Haiti:  Playing out the Options".  Haitian Frustrations, Dilemmas for U. S. Policy:  A Report of the CSIS Americas Program.  The Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, D. C., 1995.

 

^{Aristide, Jean-Bertrande.  "Restore the Road to Democracy".  The New York Times.  October 27, 1991.}

 

Associated Press.  May 18, 1994.

 

Clinton, William J.  "Executive Order 12932:  Termination of Emergency with Respect to Haiti."                      Issued October 14, 1994.

 

Ferguson, James.  Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers.  Basil Blackwell, Oxford and New York,  1987.

 

Bellegarde-Smith.  Haiti: The Breached Citadel.  Westview Profiles,  San Francisco and                     London, 1990.

 

^{Bush, George.  "Message to the Congress on Continuation of the National Emergency with        Respect to Haiti".  Delivered September 30, 1992.}

 

Faiola, Andrew S.  "Refugee Policy:  The 1994 Crisis".  Haitian Frustrations, Dilemmas for

U. S. Policy:  A Report of the CSIS Americas Program.  The Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, D. C., 1995.

 

Farah, Douglas.  "Haiti's Tiny Victims".  The Washington Post.  June 30, 1994.

 

Fauriol, Georges A.  "Reinventing Democracy".  Haitian Frustrations, Dilemmas for U. S. Policy:  A Report of the CSIS Americas Program.  The Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, D. C., 1995.

French, Howard W.  "U. S. to Push for a U. N. Police Force of 500 for Haiti". 

                                    The New York Times.  May 10, 1993.

 

Goshko, John M.  "Aristide Finances Government-in-Exile with Frozen Haitian Assets". 

The Washington Post.  January 15, 1994.

Guest, Iain.  "Refugee Policy:  Leading Up to Governor's Island".  Haitian Frustrations, Dilemmas for U. S. Policy:  A Report of the CSIS Americas Program.  The Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, D. C., 1995.

Haiti Observateur,  "Short Takes:  Financial Scandal in Haiti".  29 mai-5 juin 1991.

                                 "Democracy Versus State of Law, Legitimacy Versus Illegality". 

                                  6-13 novembre 1991. 

                                         "Haiti Emergency".  2-9 septembre 1992.

                                 "Clinton's View of the Haitian Crisis".  30 juin-7 juillet 1993.

 

Kurtz, Howard.  "A Striking Success".  The Washington Post.  June 23, 1994.

 

Robinson, Randall.  "Operation Island Storm?"  The Washington Post.  May 15, 1994.

Roth, Kenneth.  "The Task of Purging Haiti's Army".  September 20, 1993.

^{Roy, Jean-Claude H.  "Democracy Versus State of Law, Legitimacy Versus Illegality".  Haiti Observateur.  6-13 novembre 1991.}

 

Stephanopoulos, George.  All Too Human:  A Political Education.  Little, Brown and Company,       Boston, New York, London, 1999.

 

Thomas, Marie-Thérèse Labossière.  "Yesterday and Today".  Kiskeya Magazine.

                                                             Vol. 3,  No. 6.  August 1989.

                                                            "Haiti:  Le Principe de Souveraineté".  Haiti En Marche.

                                                            10 au 16 février 1993.

                                                            "Haiti:  A Matter of Sovereignty".  Haiti-Observateur.

                                                            10-17 février 1993.

                                                            "Haiti - A Matter of Sovereignty". 

                                                            The Washington Afro-American.  November 6, 1993.

 

Thomas, Marie-Thérèse Labossière and Joseph, Raymond A.  "Haiti in Perspective."

                                                            Haiti Observateur. 15-22 août 1986.

 

Thomas, Teddy and Marie-Thérèse Labossière.  "Haiti:  Another U. S. Occupation". 

                                                                              Haiti Observateur.  May 1, 1994.

                                                                             "Contre une deuxième intervention".

                                                                               Le Nouvelliste.  9 Mai 1994.

 

Thomas, Teddy.  "Current Events".  Kiskeya Magazine.  Vol. 4, No. 1.  January/February 1990.

                                                                                                      "Les six raisons de Clinton d'envahir Haiti".  Haiti-Observateur.  22-29 juin 1994.

 

Weymouth, Lally.  "Haiti's Suspect Savior".  The Washington Post.  January 24, 1993.

 

The Washington Post.  "Hapless in Haiti".  August 30, 1999.

---

^[1]   Haiti Observateur.  "Haiti in Perspective."  Marie-Thérèse Labossière Thomas and Raymond Alcide Joseph.  15-22 août 1986.  p. 8.

 

^[2]   Haiti:  The Breached Citadel.  Patrick Bellegarde-Smith.  p. 157.

 

^[3]   Haiti: The Breached Citiadel.

 

^[4]  

 

^[5]   Haiti: The Breached Citadel.  Patrick Bellegard-Smith.  p. 182.

 

^[6]   Haiti Observateur.  "Haiti in Perspective."  Marie-Thérèse Labossière Thomas and Raymond Alcide Joseph.  15-22 août 1986.  p. 8.

 

^[7]   Kiskeya.  "Yesterday and Today."  Marie-Thérèse Thomas.  Volume 3, Number 6.  August 1989.  p. 4.

 

^[8]   Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers.  James Ferguson.  p. 27.

 

^[9]   Kiskeya.  "Yesterday and Today".  Marie-Thérèse Labossière Thomas.  Volume 3, Number 6.  August 1989.  p. 3.

 

^[10]   As reported by The Washington Post.  "Haiti's Suspect Savior".  Lally Weymouth.  January 24, 1993.  p. C2.

 

^[11]   The New York Times.  "Restore the Road to Democracy".  Jean-Bertrande Aristide.  October 27, 1991.

 

^[12]   The Washington Post.  "Haiti's Suspect Savior".  Lally Weymouth.  January 24,1993.  p. C2.

 

^[13]   Haitian Frustrations:  Dilemmas for U. S. Policy.  p. 78.

 

^[14]   Message to the Congress on the Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Haiti.  George Bush.  September 30, 1992.

 

^[15]   Haitian Frustrations:  Dilemmas for U. S. Policy.  p. 81.

 

^[16]   Haiti Observateur.  "Haiti Emergency".  2-9 septembre 1992.  p. 14.

 

^[17]   Haiti-Observateur.  "Clinton's View of the Haitian Crisis".  30 juin-7 juillet 1993.  p. 19

 

^[18]   Haitian Frustrations:  Dilemmas for U. S. Policy.  p. 85.

 

^[19]   The Washington Post.  "A Striking Success".  Howard Kurtz.  June 23, 1994.  p. C1.

 

^[20]   The Washington Post.  "Operation Island Storm?"  Randall Robinson.  May 15, 1994.  p. C1.

 

^[21]   Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U. S. Policy:   p. 4.

 

^[22]   Source:  New York Times.  "U. S. Hint of Force to End Haiti Crisis Draws Opposition".  Howard W. French.  May 13, 1994.  p.  A1.

 

^[23]   Associated Press.  May 18, 1994.

 

^[24]   Haitian Frustrations:  Dilemmas for U. S. Policy.  p. 82.

 

^[25]   The New York Times.  "U. S. to Push for a U. N. Police Force of 500 for Haiti".  Howard W. French.  May 10, 1993.  p. A3.

 

^[26]   Haitian Frustrations:  Dilemmas for U. S. Policy.  p. 71-73.

 

^[27]   Haiti-Observateur.  "Les six raisons de Clinton d'envahir Haiti".  Teddy Thomas.  22-29 juin 1994.  p. 22.

 

^[28]   Haitian Frustrations:  Dilemmas for U. S. Policy.  p. 114.

 

^[29]   All Too Human.  p. 218.

 

^[30]   My American Journey.  p. 601

 

^[31]   Executive Order 12932:  Termination of Emergency with Respect to Haiti.  William J. Clinton.  October 14, 1994.

 

^[32]   Haitian Frustrations, Dilemmas for U. S. Policy.  Address Upon Return To Haiti, October 15, 1994.  p. 229.

 

^[33]   The Washington Post.  "Hapless in Haiti".  August 30, 1999.

 

^[34]   The Miami Herald.  "Aristide plots comeback in Haiti".  November 27, 1999.